















DESA Working Paper No. 12
ST/ESA/2006/DWP/12
February 2006
What is the Most Effective Monetary 
Policy for Aid-Receiving Countries?
Alessandro Prati and Thierry Tressel
Abstract
This paper analyses how monetary policy can enhance the effectiveness of volatile aid ﬂ  ows. 
We ﬁ nd that monetary policy is effective in reducing trade balance volatility. We propose the 
following taxonomy, excluding the case of emergency assistance. Monetary policy should 
slow down consumption growth and build up international reserves when aid is abundant and 
deplete them to ﬁ  nance imports and support consumption when aid is scarce. If foreign aid also 
affects productivity growth, monetary policy should take this productivity effect into account in 
responding to aid ﬂ  ows.
JEL classiﬁ  cation: O11 (Macroeconomic Analyses of Economic Development); O4 (Economic 
Growth and Aggregate Productivity); O23 (Fiscal and Monetary Policy in Development); E5 
(Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit); F35 (Foreign Aid).
Keywords: Aid effectiveness, monetary policy, real exchange rate, Dutch disease.
Alessandro Prati is an Advisor in the Research Department of the International Monetary Fund 
(email: aprati@imf.org ).
Thierry Tressel is an Economist in the Research Department of the International Monetary 
Fund (email: ttressel@imf.org). Research Department, International Monetary Fund, 
700 19th street N.W., Washington, DC 20431.UN/DESA Working Papers are preliminary 
documents circulated in a limited number of 
copies and posted on the DESA website at 
http://www.un.org/esa/desa/papers to stimulate 
discussion and critical comment.  The views 
and opinions expressed herein are those of the 
author and do not necessarily reﬂ  ect those of the 
United Nations Secretariat.  The designations 
and terminology employed may not conform to 
United Nations practice and do not imply the 
expression of any opinion whatsoever on the 
part of the Organization.
Copy editor: June Chesney
Typesetter: Valerian Monteiro
United Nations 
Department of Economic and Social Affairs
2 United Nations Plaza, Room DC2-1428
New York, N.Y. 10017, USA




What is the Most Effective Monetary Policy for Aid-Receiving Countries? ..........................  1
  Aid volatility and monetary policy practice  ......................................................................  2
    Aid is very volatile  ...............................................................................................  2
    Monetary policy’s response to aid volatility ........................................................  3
  What makes monetary policy effective? ...........................................................................  4
    Characteristics of aid-receiving countries  ............................................................  4
    How does monetary policy affect real outcomes? ...............................................  6
  When should monetary policy take action? ......................................................................  8
    Monetary policy and the distribution of aid over time.........................................  8
    What are the limits to monetary policy effectiveness? ........................................  10
  Conclusions  ..........................................................................................................  12
  References  ............................................................................................................  13What is the Most Effective Monetary 
Policy for Aid-Receiving Countries?
Alessandro Prati and Thierry Tressel1
At the recent G-8 meeting in Scotland, world leaders announced a $50 billion increase in ofﬁ  cial develop-
ment assistance (ODA) to poor countries. The objective was to help poor countries achieve the Millen-
nium Development Goals (MDGs) that emerged from the Millennium Declaration in 2000 and, thereby, 
reduce poverty. With foreign aid already representing a large share of recipients’ GDP and the precise 
timetable of the surge in new aid yet to be decided, it is critical that aid-receiving countries be ready to 
manage the macroeconomic consequences of large and potentially volatile aid ﬂ  ows.
This paper focuses on how monetary policy can enhance the effectiveness of volatile aid ﬂ  ows. 
There is growing evidence that such ﬂ  ows tend to be associated with real exchange-rate overvaluation, 
which hurts manufacturing exports and, ultimately, growth (Rajan and Subramanian, 2005a). Aid-receiv-
ing countries are well aware of this problem and tend to adjust their monetary policy stance to limit real 
exchange-rate appreciation and trade balance ﬂ  uctuations. Such monetary response to aid inﬂ  ows raises 
three questions: (i) does monetary policy have the intended effect of containing aid-induced trade balance 
volatility and real exchange-rate appreciation? (ii) if so, why?—that is, what allows monetary policy to 
affect real variables in aid-receiving countries? and (iii) under what circumstances does monetary policy 
improve welfare?
This paper addresses each of these questions in a separate section. The ﬁ  rst section presents evi-
dence of aid volatility and of the effectiveness of monetary policy in containing the associated trade bal-
ance ﬂ  uctuations. The next section discusses the features of aid-receiving countries that allow monetary 
policy to reallocate resources over time and across sectors by affecting the trade balance. The last section 
argues that the extent to which this monetary policy activism is welfare-improving depends on whether 
aid ﬂ  ows affect only consumption or also productivity growth.
Excluding the case of aid given for humanitarian purposes or emergency assistance, which has no 
reason to be saved, the last section proposes the following taxonomy. If foreign aid affects only consump-
tion, then monetary policy should slow down consumption growth and build up international reserves 
when aid is abundant and deplete them to ﬁ  nance imports and support consumption when aid is scarce. If 
foreign aid also affects productivity growth and, thereby, future consumption, then monetary policy should 
take this productivity effect into account in responding to aid ﬂ  ows. If the effect of aid on productivity—
net of possible Dutch-disease effects—is positive, then the higher productivity will contribute to support 
future consumption as aid dwindles. This implies that, in the face of a surge in aid ﬂ  ows, there would be 
a smaller need to accumulate reserves and the trade deﬁ  cit could increase somewhat. Conversely, if the 
1  This paper was prepared for the UN/DESA Development Forum on Integrating Economic and Social Policies to 
Achieve the United Nations Development Agenda, held at United Nations Headquarters, New York, on March 14 
and 15 2005. We are particularly thankful to Ratna Sahay, with whom we had many useful discussions that helped 
us think through the issues associated with monetary policy in aid-receiving countries. Manzoor Gill provided 
excellent research assistance. The views expressed in the paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily 
represent those of the IMF or IMF policy. 2  DESA Working Paper No. 12
Dutch disease makes the productivity effect of aid negative, monetary policy should be more aggressive 
in containing the trade deﬁ  cit and save resources in the form of international reserves for more productive 
future uses.
Aid volatility and monetary policy practice
Aid is very volatile
Figure 1 shows that, in several countries, the average annual ratio of net ofﬁ  cial development assistance 
(ODA) to GDP is in the 10 to 30 per cent range, with some massive differences between minimum and 
maximum annual inﬂ  ows.2 Average annual absolute changes can easily exceed 10 per cent of GDP and, in 
some instances, they have plummeted by as much as 30-40 per cent of GDP in a single year. These sud-
den reversals surpass those of net capital inﬂ  ows in emerging markets, which reached, for example, 13 per 
cent of GDP in Mexico (1993-1995) and 24 per cent of GDP in Thailand (1996-1998).
In light of the critical role of foreign aid in supporting domestic consumption, there is little doubt 
that aid volatility has negative welfare implications for aid-receiving countries. Pallage and Robe (2003) 
estimate the median welfare cost of business cycles in developing countries to be between 10 and 30 
times that of the United States. Arellano and others (2005) present numerical simulations showing that aid 
variability of the magnitude found in previous literature may have substantial detrimental welfare effects, 
albeit not large enough to wipe out the welfare beneﬁ  ts of the aid itself. This suggests that reducing the 
volatility of aid and, thereby, of consumption would yield considerable gains. There is also a substantial 
body of evidence showing that volatility has negative effects on long-term growth (e.g., see Ramey and 
Ramey, 1995).
2 Bulíř and Hamann (2002) and Celasun and Walliser (2005) discuss the ﬁ  scal implications of the volatility and 
(un)predictability of foreign aid.
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Figure 1:
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Monetary policy’s response to aid volatility
A widespread practice among aid-receiving countries is that of reducing the net domestic assets of the 
central bank in response to higher foreign aid inﬂ  ows. This policy is dubbed sterilization. Over the period 
1960-1998, we found 704 episodes—out of 1,935 episodes of foreign aid inﬂ  ows greater than 2 per cent 
of GDP—during which net domestic assets fell. More recently, several African countries—including 
Ghana, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Uganda and the United Republic of Tanzania—have drastically reduced 
their net domestic assets in response to a surge in foreign aid to prevent the real exchange rate from ap-
preciating (e.g., see Bufﬁ  e and others, 2004). 
But is sterilization policy of any consequence for real variables? To assess its effectiveness, we 
have computed a country-speciﬁ  c correlation coefﬁ  cient between changes in foreign aid and changes in 
the central bank’s net domestic assets (both measured as ratios to GDP). We have then divided up the 
sample of aid-receiving countries into a group where this correlation coefﬁ  cient is negative (‘sterilization 
group’) and a group where it is positive (‘no sterilization group’). Figure 2 shows that in the sterilization 
group there is a weaker transmission from aid volatility to the volatility of the trade balance.
This evidence of monetary policy effectiveness is robust. In Prati and Tressel (2006), we show 
that the positive association between aid volatility and trade balance volatility, as well as the difference 
between the two groups of countries, remains statistically signiﬁ  cant when: (i) we restrict the sample 
to include countries with average aid-to-GDP ratios larger than 3, 4 or 5 per cent of GDP; (ii) we con-
trol for other variables that may affect trade balance volatility, such as trade openness (whose effect is 
already netted out in ﬁ  gure 2), the volatility of commodity export prices, the size of a country (measured 
by population), the fraction of years in the sample during which the country was at war and whether a 
Figure 2:
Aid and Trade Balance Volatility
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country exports oil; (iii) we use instrumental variables to correct for a possible reverse causation from 
trade balance volatility to aid volatility; and (iv) we take into account the intensity of sterilization policy 
by interacting the correlation coefﬁ  cient between changes in aid and changes in net domestic assets with 
the aid volatility variable.
What makes monetary policy effective?
In this section, we discuss why sterilization policy can modify real variables and, speciﬁ  cally, the trade 
balance in a typical aid-receiving country.
Characteristics of aid-receiving countries
Prati and Tressel (2006) develop a stylized general equilibrium model where monetary policy affects real 
variables as long as the capital account is closed to both inﬂ  ows and outﬂ  ows and the prices of a country’s 
traded goods are set in international markets. This model also shows that monetary policy could have real 
effects not only in the short run but also in the long run if aid inﬂ  ows tend to shrink the tradable sector 
and, thereby, reduce positive productivity spillovers from it to the rest of the economy. Most aid-receiving 
countries satisfy these conditions.
International capital mobility is limited in aid-receiving countries
Countries receiving large aid inﬂ  ows usually enjoy limited international capital mobility. First, only a 
handful of aid-receiving countries have no capital account restrictions (IMF, 2005). Even when the capital 
account is relatively free of restrictions, the high levels of ofﬁ  cial indebtedness of these countries de facto 
limits their capacity to borrow on international capital markets. Indeed, over the 1990s, the median exter-
nal debt was about 80 per cent of GDP for the countries receiving more than 2 per cent of GDP in foreign 
aid. As a consequence, in the 1990s, the total of inward and outward private portfolio investments was 
much smaller in aid-receiving countries than in industrial countries, both as share of GDP and in relation 
to exports and imports (table 1).
In this context, monetary policy controls the nominal interest rates because there are no capital 
ﬂ  ows that can offset the tightening or loosening of the monetary policy stance. For example, if the central 
bank raises domestic interest rates above international rates, foreign capital will not ﬂ  ow into the country 
to push rates back down. Moreover, domestic investors have usually no access to foreign ﬁ  nancial assets. 
This restriction limits their saving instruments to domestic bonds and cash. As a consequence, any in-
Table 1.
  Private portfolio investments in aid-receiving countries
Average, 1990s




Aid-receiving countries Industrial countries Aid-receiving countries Industrial countries
Median 0.7 8.0 53.2 51.2
Minimum 0 2.6 18.3 15.9
Maximum 10.3 49.4 199.5 130.2What is the Most Effective Monetary Policy for Aid-Receiving Countries?  5
crease or decrease in the supply of public sector bonds must be met by an increase or a decrease of private 
non-cash ﬁ  nancial savings.
Finally, governments of countries receiving large amounts of foreign aid are not allowed to save 
aid directly, nor can they borrow against future aid disbursements. Indeed, donors usually require recipi-
ents to spend development assistance when it is disbursed and aid ﬂ  ows are too uncertain to be pledged as 
collateral. 
Aid-receiving countries are small open economies with 
internationally determined prices of tradable goods
Aid-receiving countries are open economies where international trade usually represents a large share of 
GDP (table 1). Hence a large share of their domestic price index is accounted for by the price of tradable 
goods. At the same time, given that exports and imports of each of these countries represent small shares 
of total exports and imports of the products in which they trade (table 2), the prices of their traded goods 
are likely to be set internationally. This implies that their domestic demand conditions are unlikely to af-
fect their import and export prices.
Foreign aid can hurt tradable industries (Dutch disease)
Dutch disease usually refers to the adverse effects on the (manufacturing) traded sector of natural resource 
discoveries, or of foreign aid. Its origin is the overvaluation of the Dutch real exchange rate that followed 
the discovery of natural gas deposits in the North Sea, within the borders of the Netherlands, in the 1950s 
and 1960s.3
When part of foreign aid is spent on domestic non-tradable goods, the price of non-tradable goods 
rises relative to tradable goods. This real appreciation draws resources out of the tradable goods sector 
into the non-tradable goods sector. While this reallocation is not inefﬁ  cient per se, the shrinking of the 
tradable goods sector will reduce growth if the source of productivity expansion—e.g., learning-by-doing 
(LBD) externalities—is in the tradable goods sector. In a recent cross-section study, Rajan and Subrama-
nian (2005a) have found strong evidence that aid negatively affects the growth of tradable sectors. Speciﬁ  -
cally, they show that foreign aid reduces output growth of the more labour-intensive industries, which tend 
to constitute the export sectors of developing countries (ﬁ  gure 3).
3  Theoretical models of the Dutch disease have been developed by van Wijnbergen (1984), Krugman (1987), Sachs 
and Warner (1995) and Gylfason, Herbertson and Zoega (1997), among others.
Table 2.
  Size of tradable sectors in aid-receiving countries
  (percentage of total exports and imports of aid-receiving countries)
Average, 1990s, countries receiving aid > 2% GDP
Exports
(percentage of total exports)
Imports
(percentage of total imports)
Median 0.037 0.060
Minimum 0.000 0.002
Maximum 4.737 3.5806  DESA Working Paper No. 12
There are also several country-speciﬁ  c studies presenting evidence of productivity beneﬁ  ts from 
exporting. Blalock and Gertler (2004) show that Indonesian manufacturing ﬁ  rms became more productive 
by ‘learning through exporting’. Van Biesebroeck (2005) ﬁ  nds that productivity of manufacturing plants 
in African countries increases after entering export markets. Fernandes and Isgut (2005) present evidence 
of ‘learning-by-exporting’ by young Colombian manufacturing plants between 1981 and 1991.4
Finally, Dutch disease concerns cannot be simply dismissed by observing that small manufactur-
ing sectors and commodity-dominated export sectors limit the scope for productivity gains in aid-receiv-
ing countries. Manufacturing sectors actually account for non-negligible shares of exports, making up, for 
example, 15 per cent of exports in Tanzania and Kenya, 25 per cent in Ghana, and 90 per cent in Bangla-
desh (World Bank, 2002). Moreover, manufacturing export shares in several countries that successfully 
developed over the past 40 years were initially small and comparable to those of today’s aid-receiving 
countries. In the early sixties, manufacturing exports represented, respectively, 2, 5 and 20 per cent of 
total exports in Thailand, Malaysia and the Republic of Korea (South Korea). At the end of the nineties, 
the same shares were 75 per cent in Thailand and 90 per cent in Malaysia and South Korea. Finally, pro-
ductivity gains (and/or quality improvements) could also take place in the commodity-exporting sectors 
because commodities are often processed domestically to meet international standards, creating some 
scope for positive LBD spillovers.
How does monetary policy affect real outcomes?
But how do the characteristics of aid-receiving countries listed above allow monetary policy to have real 
effects? This section describes the channels and the mechanisms through which monetary policy can help 
manage volatile aid inﬂ  ows.
4  By contrast, Adam and Bevan (2003) ﬁ  nd that the impact of aid on the real exchange rate can be complex, and 
may not be large, in a model calibrated on Ugandan data.
Source: Rajan and Subramanian 
(2005a).
a  The difference in average growth 
in annual value added between 
industries with above and below 
median labour intensity in each 
country is plotted against the 
average aid-to-GDP received 
by each country (Rajan and 
Subramanian, 2005a).
Figure 3:
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Does monetary policy matter for nominal magnitudes only?
In standard macroeconomic models, monetary policy only affects nominal magnitudes in the long run 
(see Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1999: chaps. 8 and 9). The main exception is the case of high-inﬂ  ation coun-
tries where inﬂ  ation beyond a certain threshold has been shown to have negative effects on welfare. For 
example, high inﬂ  ation exacerbates frictions in the ﬁ  nancial system (Boyd, Levine and Smith, 2001) and 
affects the poor disproportionately (Easterly and Fischer, 2001). The level of inﬂ  ation is also generally 
included in indices of ‘good policies‘ that may enhance aid effectiveness (Burnside and Dollar, 2000, 
2004a, 2004b) together with ﬁ  scal and trade policies.5 However, these are not the channels through which 
monetary policy can reduce the impact of aid volatility and contribute to making aid effective. This effec-
tiveness depends, instead, critically on the monetary policy’s ability to reallocate resources over time and 
across sectors.
Monetary policy can redistribute resources over time and sectors by modifying real interest rates. 
Monetary policy can affect national savings when capital markets are not complete. This is the case when 
agents cannot borrow or lend internationally and have access to a limited set of domestic ﬁ  nancial sav-
ing instruments. In this context, a monetary tightening (or equivalently an increase in the nominal interest 
rate controlled by the central bank) compresses aggregate demand by raising the demand for domestic 
bonds and reducing money balances. With a closed capital account, capital inﬂ  ows cannot undo this rise 
in nominal interest rates. Moreover, aggregate savings increase as the central bank withdraws liquidity 
because domestic agents cannot substitute domestic bonds for foreign bonds.
At the same time, the creation of base money through the improved current account and accumu-
lation of foreign exchange reserves feeds back into the money supply and partially offsets the impact of 
the initial sale of government bonds. This offset is only partial because the demand for non-tradables also 
falls and the improvement in the current account is smaller than the reduction in aggregate demand.
Finally, to the extent that prices of tradable goods are set internationally, the fall in the aggregate 
price index that follows the reduction in domestic demand is less than proportional to the reduction in 
the stock of money. Therefore, real money balances fall (equivalently, real interest rates rise) following a 
monetary tightening, and national savings increase. Symmetrically, a monetary expansion would lead to a 
fall in real interest rates and a reduction in national savings. This implies that monetary policy can inﬂ  u-
ence agents’ decisions about allocating consumption over time.
A corollary of monetary policy’s effectiveness in reallocating resources over time is its ability to 
reallocate resources across sectors and, thereby, offset Dutch disease effects. Given that the price of trad-
able goods is set internationally, aggregate demand changes induced by monetary policy affect the rela-
tive price of tradable and non-tradable goods (the real exchange rate) and, therefore, the relative size of 
tradable and non-tradable sectors.6 For example, a monetary tightening compresses aggregate demand and 
puts downward pressure on prices of non-tradable goods while leaving the price of tradable goods un-
changed. This real depreciation tends to increase the size of tradable sectors and prevent aid inﬂ  ows from 
diminishing the associated positive productivity spillovers.
5  Easterly, Levine and Roodman (2004), among others, have raised doubts on the robustness of Burnside and 
Dollar’s results. 
6  Of course, factors of production (in particular labour) must be relatively mobile across sectors for changes in 
relative prices to translate into changes in the size of tradable and non-tradable sectors.8  DESA Working Paper No. 12
When should monetary policy take action?
Monetary policy and the distribution of aid over time
Aid inﬂ  ows tend to be associated with money supply expansions irrespective of the exchange-rate regime. 
Spending foreign aid requires donors or recipient governments to exchange foreign-currency-denominated 
aid into the domestic currency of the recipient. In ﬁ  xed exchange-rate regimes, international reserves and 
base money would then increase at impact. This can be seen as a benchmark case as the large majority of 
aid-receiving countries have adopted either a ﬁ  xed exchange-rate regime or a managed ﬂ  oat.7, 8
Figure 4 illustrates how money supply and money demand determine the equilibrium trade bal-
ance for a given distribution of aid over time. We will use it to discuss the appropriate monetary policy re-
sponse to a shift in donors’ policies that leads to front-loading aid disbursements while keeping their total 
net present value unchanged. Recent donors’ initiatives aimed at helping countries achieve the MDGs by 
2015, such as the International Financing Facility (IFF) proposed by the United Kingdom of Great Britain 
and Northern Ireland, would have similar effects.9
7  According to the classiﬁ  cation of exchange-rate regimes in Reinhart and Rogoff (2004), during all instances of aid 
inﬂ  ows greater than 2 per cent of GDP in the 1990s, the median exchange-rate regime was a de facto crawling peg 
with freely ﬂ  oating regimes accounting for less than 1 per cent of the observations.
8  Foreign aid is often associated with an increase in base money also in ﬂ  oating exchange-rate regimes. When aid is 
aimed at budgetary support, the government usually deposits foreign aid at the central bank. Initially, this opera-
tion increases both international reserves and government deposits, leaving total base money unchanged. But, as 
soon as the government draws down the balance on its deposit account at the central bank, net domestic assets and 
base money increase.
9  The IFF amounts to front-loading aid disbursements. Under the IFF proposal, donors would make off-budget 
pledges of future increases in their aid commitments that would be used as backing to issue AAA-rated bonds. 
Bond proceeds would be channelled through existing aid programmes. Over time, the IFF would draw down the 
donor pledges to pay off its bonds. Conversely, debt relief amounts to back-loading aid disbursements in a predict-
able, albeit potentially erratic, manner because the transfer of resources to recipient countries will materialize 
when future debt-service payments are due.
Source: Prati and Tressel(2006).
Figure 4:
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First, consider the case in which foreign aid impacts only on consumption and has no effect on 
productivity. Suppose that the trade balance prior to the front-loading of aid is TB0 and that, from the 
welfare perspective of smoothing consumption over time, the economy would need to raise current con-
sumption and lower the trade balance to TB1
s    . This new allocation could be achieved by bringing the right 
amount of aid forward. Figure 4 shows, however, a case in which lack of donors’ coordination leads to an 
excessive front-loading of aid (A) with an unwarranted expansion of money supply, current consumption 
and the trade deﬁ  cit.10
To bring the trade balance back from TB1 to TB1
s     , the central bank can undo some of the money 
supply expansion associated with the front-loading of aid. The appropriate sterilization policy would re-
quire the central bank to sell an amount B of bonds to the private sector. This sale would bring the econ-
omy to the new equilibrium E1
s    , where higher real interest rates make agents augment their savings and a 
more depreciated real exchange rate reduces the trade deﬁ  cit.
The reason the central bank needs to take action is that a closed capital account prevents domestic 
agents from acquiring foreign ﬁ  nancial instruments and from saving part of the aid proceeds directly. In 
practice, the central bank ends up making the purchase of foreign ﬁ  nancial assets in their place by accu-
mulating international reserves.11
Second, consider the case in which aid impacts not only on consumption but also on productiv-
ity, and more generally on medium-term growth. The sign of this effect is a mooted issue in development 
economics. Some recent studies have shown that certain categories of foreign aid accounting for about 45 
per cent of aid ﬂ  ows—budget and balance-of-payments support, investments in infrastructure and aid for 
sectors such as agriculture and industry—have large effects on short-run growth (e.g., see Clemens, Rade-
let and Bhavnani, 2004). Others have emphasized that absorptive capacity problems may lead to positive 
but decreasing marginal returns.12 Another set of studies has failed to ﬁ  nd any evidence of a positive as-
sociation between aid and productivity growth (e.g., see Easterly, Levine and Roodman, 2004; Rajan and 
Subramanian, 2005b). Finally, there is also some evidence that the marginal returns of foreign aid do not 
only diminish with size but turn negative beyond a certain threshold (Hansen and Tarp, 2000). This result 
can be attributed to the presence of Dutch disease or to the potential corrupting effects of large amounts of 
aid on institutions.13
Given that productivity growth affects future income and consumption, there is little doubt that 
monetary policy should take the productivity impact of aid ﬂ  ows into account. If aid ﬂ  ows have positive 
productivity effects, the appropriate front-loading of aid is larger than in the case where aid impacts only 
on consumption. This happens because future growth would augment future consumption, thereby reduc-
ing the need for future aid. In this case, the consumption smoothing trade balance would be somewhat 
10  Of course, this example does not apply to the case of humanitarian, emergency or post-conﬂ  ict aid, where an aid-
induced increase in consumption would merely return consumption to its pre-crisis level.
11  International reserves increase because the deterioration in the trade balance from the initial level TB0 is smaller 
than the additional aid inﬂ  ow.
12  Aid volatility worsens absorptive capacity problems. Consider the case of projects requiring repeated inputs over 
the years with donors disbursing aid in a single instalment or irregularly. For example, donors could disburse aid to 
build a school or a hospital, but leave recipient countries without a regular source of funds to keep the buildings in 
good condition or to pay teachers and doctors in the following years.
13  Tornell and Lane (1998, 1999) and Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian (2003) stress that powerful groups tend to ap-
propriate windfall earnings, leading to a ‘voracity’ effect. Similarly, Svensson (2000) and Torvik (2002) emphasize 
how aid may increase rent-seeking.10  DESA Working Paper No. 12
smaller than TB1
s     , implying that the central bank’s bond sales would need to be smaller than the amount 
B shown in ﬁ  gure 4. In other words, the central bank should engage in fewer sterilization operations and 
tolerate a larger trade deﬁ  cit than in the case where aid ﬂ  ows impact only on consumption.
Conversely, if the marginal returns of aid on productivity decline or become negative beyond a 
certain threshold, then front-loading aid disbursements would curtail future consumption, and monetary 
policy should conduct bond sales in excess of B with the objective of saving more resources for future use 
and raising the trade balance above TB1
s     .
Figure 4 allows us also to discuss a possible scenario in which there is no front-loading of aid 
(A=0) although some would be appropriate (TB1
s     <TB0). This is a case in which the immediate consump-
tion beneﬁ  ts of aid are large but disbursements are too back-loaded. Can monetary policy substitute for 
the donors and bring resources forward to boost current consumption? The answer to this question is 
positive, provided that the central bank has enough reserves to decumulate and to ﬁ  nance the larger trade 
deﬁ  cit TB1
s     . Monetary policy would need to be expansionary with the central bank purchasing bonds 
rather than selling them. Domestic agents would use the additional liquidity to consume more tradable 
and non-tradable goods, causing real appreciation and a higher trade deﬁ  cit. With unchanged aid and capi-
tal inﬂ  ows, international reserves would then be needed to ﬁ  nance the latter.
What are the limits to monetary policy effectiveness?
Individual characteristics of aid-receiving countries may vary considerably and with them the scope for 
monetary policy to take effective action in response to volatile aid disbursements.
As already discussed in the previous section, the key prerequisites for monetary policy effective-
ness are a relatively closed capital account and an economy small enough to take the prices of tradable 
goods as given. In the few aid-receiving countries that have open capital accounts, monetary policy may 
either be ineffective or have effects opposite to what is desired. A standard Keynesian model with capital 
mobility would predict, in fact, that monetary tightening would not lead to real exchange-rate depreciation 
but rather to both nominal appreciation, as higher interest rates fuel private capital inﬂ  ows, and temporary 
real appreciation, as prices remain sticky in the short run.14 The evidence presented in the previous section 
on the ability of sterilization policy to contain trade balance ﬂ  uctuations is, however, consistent with mon-
etary tightening leading to real depreciation as a model with no capital mobility would predict.
Another issue is whether monetary policy effectiveness depends critically on the central bank’s 
ability to buy and sell bonds. This is an important issue because many aid-receiving countries do not have 
well-developed domestic bond or money markets (Christensen, 2004, and IMF, 2005), although the size of 
such markets has grown recently in several of those countries. The effectiveness of money market operations 
has often been limited by problems of ﬁ  scal dominance, limited market size and underdeveloped interbank 
market, or weak ﬁ  nancial intermediaries. In practice, other forms of sterilization are available, including: (i) 
the central bank’s issuance of its own debt certiﬁ  cates; (ii) higher reserve requirements, which, for a given 
level of base money, reduce the money multiplier and overall money supply; and (iii) ﬁ  scal surpluses or a 
14  Krugman (1987) develops a variant of this class of models where learning-by-doing externalities create the 
potential for Dutch disease. As in the analytical framework we used, these externalities allow temporary monetary 
policies to have permanent effects on competitiveness. In Krugman’s model, however, the current account has to 
be balanced in every period. As a consequence, tight money leads to real appreciation because exports need to fall 
in line with the lower imports caused by the monetary contraction.What is the Most Effective Monetary Policy for Aid-Receiving Countries?  11
shift of government deposits from the banking sector to the central bank, depending on whether the govern-
ment banks with the central bank or not.
The possibility of using ﬁ  scal balances to sterilize the monetary impact of a surge in aid inﬂ  ows 
raises the question of whether ﬁ  scal policy could not take responsibility for modifying aggregate demand 
and redistributing the effects of aid over time, leaving other goals to monetary policy. In principle, ﬁ  scal 
policy could be just as effective as monetary policy in managing aid inﬂ  ows, especially if taxes and trans-
fers are lump-sum. In practice, this is the case only when foreign aid is delivered in the form of budgetary  
support and recipient governments can delay spending the aid disbursed by donors, thereby raising the ﬁ  s-
cal balance  and sterilizing the impact of foreign aid on aggregate demand. Instead, in the case of project 
aid or of donors requiring  all aid to be spent immediately, the volatility of aid ﬂ  ows makes ﬁ  scal policy 
unsuitable for sterilization purposes. Fiscal policy would need to change taxes or expenditures frequently 
and in opposite directions to offset the large year-to-year swings in aid ﬂ  ows (ﬁ  gure 1). This would be a 
daunting task even in countries with efﬁ  cient tax and expenditure systems because there are much lon-
ger decision-making lags associated with ﬁ  scal policy than with monetary policy and because of likely 
political resistance to raising taxes and cutting expenditures. In aid-receiving countries, notoriously weak 
tax administration and public expenditure management systems would give even less latitude to the ﬁ  scal 
authority in timing tax and expenditure changes as required by the vagaries of aid ﬂ  ows.
An important limit to pursuing sterilization policy is the sterilization costs associated with bond 
issuance, which cannot be overlooked in practice. If the taxes needed to ﬁ  nance the differential between 
the interest rates on sterilization bonds and international reserves are distortionary or costly to be levied, 
sterilization would have welfare costs that should be weighed against the beneﬁ  ts of consumption smooth-
ing. These costs would be even larger if high interest rates depressed interest-sensitive private investment 
that might enhance productivity. When sterilization is implemented through ﬁ  scal surpluses, it may in-
volve other costs. The government may, in fact, decide to achieve the required ﬁ  scal surpluses by post-
poning the very public investment that the aid increase was supposed to ﬁ  nance (as opposed to reducing 
current expenditure). In this case, the loss of productivity gains due to public investment might offset the 
beneﬁ  ts in terms of smaller productivity losses due to Dutch disease. This implies that monetary policy 
cannot be seen in isolation from, and should be coordinated with, ﬁ  scal policy.
Finally, when aid ﬂ  ows are too back-loaded and monetary policy needs to be expansionary, insuf-
ﬁ  cient international reserves could become a binding constraint. This constraint is all the more tight when 
aid-receiving countries keep international reserves for other purposes as well, including the need to cope 
with volatile terms-of-trade shocks and the risks of not being able to roll over short-term external debt. 
Table 3 shows that, indeed, the average aid-receiving country has only a limited amount of reserves that 
can be used to ﬁ  nance higher imports and consumption.
Table 3.
  International reserves in aid-receiving countries
  (in months of imports)
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Conclusions
This paper points to both opportunities and risks for the conduct of monetary policy in aid-receiving 
countries. The challenge is twofold: while undoing some of the monetary expansion associated with aid 
inﬂ  ows might help smooth consumption over time and contain Dutch disease, excessive sterilization may 
stunt current consumption and reduce other sources of productivity growth or factor accumulation. Choos-
ing the appropriate monetary policy stance requires factoring in a multitude of elements, ranging from the 
beneﬁ  ts of higher current consumption to determinants of aid effectiveness and productivity growth such 
as the quality of institutions, corruption and capacity constraints. A reliable forecast of future aid inﬂ  ows 
is, of course, another critical input to monetary policy formulation.
What is clear is that, in a typical aid-receiving country where aid ﬂ  ows are often disbursed in a 
typically haphazard manner and access to capital markets is limited, monetary policy decisions can have a 
vital bearing not only on nominal magnitudes but also on real ones such as consumption and productivity 
growth. When aid ﬂ  ows are excessively front-loaded, monetary policy can improve welfare by increasing 
gross national savings in the form of higher international reserves. Conversely, when aid ﬂ  ows are exces-
sively back-loaded, an expansionary monetary policy can improve welfare, provided that the stock of 
international reserves is large enough.
While the theoretical arguments for welfare-improving monetary policy intervention are compel-
ling, some perspective is in order. There are, in fact, limits to the extent monetary policy can correct the 
effects of an inappropriate distribution of aid over time. When aid ﬂ  ows are excessively front-loaded, ster-
ilization costs may induce central banks to accumulate a less-than-optimal amount of reserves. By con-
trast, when aid ﬂ  ows are deemed excessively back-loaded, insufﬁ  cient international reserves can prevent 
monetary policy from bringing resources forward.
Faced with these limits of monetary policy, donors could demonstrate a new found resolve and 
decide to coordinate their actions, minimize aid volatility and, thereby, reduce the need for monetary 
policy intervention. Increasing multilateral and bilateral donors’ coordination in disbursing aid—a key 
objective of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) process introduced in the late 1990s—is then 
essential.
Allowing recipient countries to save aid directly for later use is an alternative to be considered if 
greater coordination of donor countries turns out to be an unrealistic objective. Donors could set up coun-
try-speciﬁ  c reserve funds in which aid is accumulated and then spent when aid ﬂ  ows or other resources 
dry up. The key challenge would, however, be the governance of such funds, which requires resolving the 
tension between predictable and timely assistance, on the one hand, and donors’ desire to subject the use 
of the Fund’s resources to conditionality, on the other. Indeed, for aid-receiving countries, international 
reserves are an appealing alternative, as they allow these countries to save resources and use them at their 
discretion. Nonetheless, given that sterilization policy may be costly, there is still scope for future work 
aimed at designing a governance structure of aid reserve funds that might become acceptable to both 
recipients and donors.
Finally, the idea that there are circumstances in which some aid is better saved owes nothing 
to the notion that foreign aid might be too generous. Our results do not provide any indication that an 
increase in the overall net present value of aid can reduce welfare. They pertain, instead, to the welfare What is the Most Effective Monetary Policy for Aid-Receiving Countries?  13
implications of the distribution of a given net present value of aid over time. From this perspective, the de-
clared objective reiterated at the International Conference on Financing for Development, held in Monter-
rey, Mexico, in March 2002—to raise ODA to 0.7 per cent of industrial countries’ GDP from a level that 
is currently only about one third of that target—can only be welcome.15
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